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revenue to replace the "inflation tax."
The Policy. Planning, and Research  Complcx disuributcs  PPR Working Papers  to disseminate thc fEndings  of work in progress and to
enoourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others intcrested in development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited  accordingly.  Thc ftndings.  interpreustions, and conclusions ame  the



















































































































In their model of the relationship between  of atout  7.5 percent of GDP in steady state (this
inflation, the inflation tax, and scigniorage,  was true for the tablita and pre-Austral periods).
Kiguel and Neumeyer analyze the Argentine  Between June 1978 ard  April 1985, there was a
expcrience - for the last decade.  clear, positive relation betwcen inflation and the
inflation tax for rates of i. flation below 18
To study the robustness of their model under  percent.
different regimes, they split the study into three
periods - each  with distinctive rules about the  Events are more difficult to interpret at
exchange rate, interest rates, and the mobility of  inflation rates near and above 20 percent.  in the
intemational capital flows.  20 percent range, the inflation tax ranged from 7
to 10 percent of GDP.  Steady-state seigniorage
Argcntina - where increases in inflation  is at a maximum 7.5 percent when inflation is
appear to be closely linked to government  around 20 percent a month.  Increases in infla-
attempts to raise seigniorage - is a natural  tion above 20 percent do not give the go .m-
choice for this study because of its persistent  ment more inflation tax revenues. The revenue
high rates of inflation and fiscal imbalance.  from inflation seems to fall unambiguously once
Monetization of fiscal deficits becomes a major  inflation exceeds 22 percent.
force for creating money and inflation in coun-
tries with limited access to domcstic and foreign  The inflation tax remained close to, and
credit.  even exceeded, maximum sustainable levels
during the first half of the 1980s - and was
Kiguel and Neumeyer found fhat inflation in  probably the single most important source of
Argentina played an important role in generating  revenue to the government at that time.  The im-
public sector revenues.  plication:  any serious stabilization effort
requires finding an altemative source of revenue
At the revenue-maximizing rate of inflation,  to replace the inflation tax.
thcy found, the govemment can get seigniorage
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Figures  37*Seigniorage  is the  profit  on  minting  coins,  earned  by the  mint,
usually  owned  or farmed  by the  sovereign,  who  has a certain  'droit  de
seigneur'  or monopoly  on such  profits."  "The  Contrast  ...  may  well  turn
on  whether  the  competitors  (mints)  are  interested  in short-  or long-run
gains.  In the  short  run,  profits  can  be  maximized  by adulteration;  in the
long-run,  by producing  to  quality  standards." 1
I. Introduction
Public  sector  deficits  occupy  a central  role  in  causing  inflation  in
many  developing  countries. This  is  especially  important  in  those  countries
where  the  government  has  to rely  on the  central  bank  to finauice  its  fiscal
imbalance,  due  to its  limited  access  to domestic  and  foreign  borrowing.
Monetization  of fiscal  deficits  thus  becomes  the  major  force  for  money
creation  and inflation.
Higher  rates  of inflation,  however,  do  not  always  provide  more
resources  to the  government.  There  are several  reasons  for  this  outcome.
First,  as  we know from  the  literatuire  on the  inflation  tax,  e.g.  Friedman
(1971),  tiere  is  a revenue  maximizing  rate  of inflation  which  corresponds
to the  point  where  the  demand  for  money  is  unit  elastic. Beyond  that
point,  further  increases  in inflation  will  actually  reduce  the  inflation
tax revenue  in the  steady  state. Second,  there  could  be changes  in
inflation  which  are  not  of a fiscal  nature. The  balance  of payments  theory
of inflation,  as  presented  in  Liviatan  and  Pitterman  (1985),  provides  an
example  of such  a case. Liviatan  and  Pitterman  found  that  in  Israel
1  ChArles,  P.  Kindleberger  (1984),  A Financial  History  of  Western  Europ,
London,  Ailen  &  Unwin.2
inflation  accelerated  at times  when the  economy  was facing  serious  external
imbalances.  Balance  of  payments  problems  triggered  a  mazi-devaluation
which  very quickly  moved  the  economy  to  a higher  inflationary  *plateaus.
If there  is inertia  in the  inflation  process  which  is  accommodated  through
monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies,  inflation  could  remain  at the  higher
plateau  even  in the  absence  of a change  in  the  budget  deficit.
The  relationship  between  inflation  and  money  financed  budget  deficits
is illustrated  in figure  1,  where  we show  data  on seigniorage,  and
inflation  rates  for  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Israel  and  Mexico.
Seigniorage  represents  the  amount  of resources  that  the  government  gains
from  printing  money  and  is  measured  here  as a  percentage  of  GDP.  These
figures  indicate  that  there  are  two  different  types  of relationships
between  seigniorage  and  inflation. In  Brazil,  Israel  and  Mexico
seigniorage  has  been  relatively  stable  over  the  years  while  inflation  has
displayed  a tendency  to rise. In these  three  countries  the  fiscal  approach
does  not seem  to  provide  a convincing  explanation  of the  evolution  of
inflation. In  Argentina  and  Bolivia,  on the  other  hand,  increases  in
inflation  appear  to  be closely  linked  to attempts  by the  government  to
raise  seigniorage.
In  this  paper,  we will investigate  the  relationship  between
inflation,  the inflation  tax,  and  seigniorage  on the  basis  of the  Argentine
experience  of the  last  decade. The  persistent  high  rates  of inflation  and
the  continuously  large  fiscal  isibalances  observed  in  Argentina  makes  this
country  a  natural  choice  for  a case  study  on this  topic.
The  paper  will be organized  as follows. In section  II  we present  the
basic  analytical  framework  and  discuss  what is the  appropriate  measure  ofseigniorage  for  Argentina. The  framework  is similar  to other  models  of
inflation  finance  (e.g.  Bailey  (1956),  Friedman  (1971),  Calvo  (1978),  Anand
and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1989),  etc.),  but  we adjust  it to  incorporate  the  major
stylized  facts  of the  Argentine  financial  system. This  section  establishes
that  due  to the  structure  of reserve  requirements  and  the  charge.  and
compensations  that  the  central  bank imposes  on the  various  deposits  in  the
financial  system,  Ml is the  basis  for  the  inflation  tax. This  discussion
is continued  in section  III  where  we examine  the  behavior  of the  inflation
tax  and  seigniorage  in  Argentina  from  1978  till  1985.
In section  IV  we conduct  an empirical  study  of  the  demand  for  money
based  on monthly  data  for  the  period  1979-85. Our results  are  of interest
for  two  reasons. First,  we split  the  sample  in  three  different  periods  for
estimation  purposes,  each  of them  having  distinctive  rules  for  the  exchange
rate,  interest  rates  and  on the  mobility  of international  capital  flows.
This  enabled  us to study  the  robustness  of  our  estimated  parameters  to
regime  changes. Second,  we  were able  to overcome  the  simultaneity  bias
that  arises  because  of the  correlation  between  the  opportunity  cost  of
holding  money  and  monetary  shocks. This  was  possible  because  during  the
first  period  the  money  stock  was truly  endogenous  and  interest  rates  were
determined  by the  preannounced  rate  of  devaluation  and  by arbitrage
conditions.  For  the  third  period  we found  that  the  stock  of  money  and  rate
of inflation  were cointegrated  and  therefore  we could  obtain  consistent
estimators  of the  money  demand  function's  parameters.
We conclude  in  section  V  with a  discussion  of the  implications  of our
empirical  results  for  the  inflationary  process  in  Argentina.4
II.  Financial  Arrangements  and  Inflation  Tax
A. Seigniorage  and  Inflation
Money  creation  is an important  source  of  public  sector  revenue  in
many  developing  countries. The  analytical  literature  on this  subject  (e.g.
Friedman  (1971),  Calvo  (1978),  Bruno  (1988),  Bruno  and  Fischer  (1986),
Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1986),  etc.)  usually  considers  a closed  economy,
where  money  creation  is  driven  by fiscal  needs.
In this  paper  we will follow  the  presentation  used  in  Dornbusch  and
Fischer  (1986),  which  will be  modified  to introduce  a  banking  system. The
money  supply  process  is  captured  in  equation  (1)
(1)  AH - Pg
where  H represents  the  monetary  base (i.e.  the  liabilities  of the  central
bank),  P is  the  price  level  and  g is the  monetized  portion  of the  deficit.
AH denotes  the  change  in the  monetary  base  over  time. AH/P  denotes  the
real  amount  of resources  that  the  government  receives  from  printing  money,
sometimes  referred  to as seigniorage.
When there  is  a banking  system,  total  money  supply  (M)  will  be given
by
(2)  M - kH5
where  k is the  money  multiplier.  The  monitary  base  can  be  held  as  currency
(C)  by the  public  or used  to satisfy  thi  reserve  requirements  on  bank
deposits  (D). Defining  the  reserve  reqtu  -cement  ratio  as r,  then
k - (1  +  cl/(c  +  r),  where  c is  the  currencT-deposit  ratio. The stock  of
base  money  is  H - (1/k)M. Real  money  balances  (m)  are  defined  as
(3)  m  - M/P  -kH/P  - kh
where  h - H/P.  Differentiating  (3)  with  respect  to time  yields
(4)  m-  M/P -mm  - k(AH/P  - lh)
=  k(g - fh)
where  m - dm/dt,  g represents  seigniorage  and  wh is the  inflation  tax. In
the  long  run  equilibrium  (i.e.  when real  money  balances  are  constant)
seigniorage  is  equal  te the  inflation  tax. The  monetary  base (i.e.  the
stock  of central  bank  liabilities)  represents  the  base  for  the  inflation
tax.
The  standard  presentation  of the  inflation  tax  model  is  completed
with the  specification  of the  money  demand  function. In Cagan's  model  it
is  given  by
(5)  md  =  khd  , Ae-aP6
where  A  is  a  constait,  p is the  expected  rate  of inflation."  If  we  assume
that  expectations  are  rational  then  p - f.
The  basic  structure  of the  mode?.  is summarized  in  figure  2.  The
m  a  0  scheaule,  from  equation  (4),  is  a  rectangular  hyperbola  showing  the
combinations  of I and  h such  that  seigniorage  equals  inflation  tax. The  md
schedule  depicts  the  pairs  of  h and  i such  that  the  money  market  clears.
There  are  two  stationary  equilibria,  points  A and  B, at  which  both
conditions  are satisfied  simultaneously.  The  characteristics  of the  model
and  its  stability  properties  are  discussed  at some  length  in  Bruno  and
Fischer  (1986),  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1986),  Evans  and  Yarrow  (1981),  and
Kiguel  (1989).
A clear  implication  of the  model  is  that  if the  economy  starts  at the
low  inflation  equilibrium  (point  A),  and  that  print  is stable,  an increase
in  the  budget  deficit  (shown  by an upward  shift  in the  m - 0 schedule)  will
lead  to a  permanent  increase  in the  rate  of inflation.  A second  important
implication  is that  there  is  a  maximum  amount  of seigniorage  that  the
government  can  extract  without  destabilizing  inflation.  This  corresponds
to  point  C in figure  2,  where  the  demand  for  money  is tangent  to the  m- O
schedule. Seigniorage  in  excess  of that  amount  cannot  be financed  in  a
stable  way.  In that  case,  under  plausible  assumptions  regarding  thTe
adjustment  in  the  money  market,  there  will be a  continuous  acceleration  in
inflation  (see  Kiguel  (1989)). Notice  that  the  continuous  increase  in
inflation  will  occur  in spite  of a constant  level  of seigniorage.
2  Cagan's  model  represents  the  traditional  way to analyze  this  problem.
One possible  extension  of the  model  could  be based  upon the demand  for  money
recently  used in  Eckstein  and  Leiderman  (1989).7
B. Remuneration  of Reserve  Requirements  and  Seigniorage
The  analysis  needs  to be  modified  in those  cases  where  the  central
bank  pays interest  on  bank reserves. This  practice  has  be*n  adopted  in
many  high inflation  countries  (e.g.  Argentina,  Mexico,  etc.)  as a  way to
reduce  the  costs  of financial  intermediation.
For  simplicity,  we can  assume  that  the  central  bank  p ys  an interest
rate Mi)  on  bank reserves,  and  that  i - i.  Under  the  fractional  banking
system  being  considered  total  deposits  (D)  are
(6)  D - 1/(c  +  r)H.
We define  d - DIP.  In our  example,  seigniorage  will  be
(7)  AH/P  - rrd  - AC/P  - g;
in  other  words,  the  government  collects  the  inflation  tax  on currency,
while  it returns  to the  private  sector  the  tax  on deposits  through  interest
payments  on reserves.
An additional  difficulty  for  the  interpretation  of the  results  arises
if  we extend  the  model  to an open  economy. In that  case seigniorage  can  be
used  either  to finance  the  budget  deficit  or  to accumulate  international
reserves. This  element  was  very important  in  Mexico  during  1987,3  where
seigniorage  levels  were relatively  large,  as  can  be seen  from  figure  l1E,
3  A similar  phenomenon  is  observed  in  Chile  and  Argentina  during  the  period
of the predetermined  exchange  rates (the  Tablita).  In both episodes  money
creation  was linked  to accumulation  of international  reserves  by the central
bank.8
while  the  operational  deficit  of the  consolidated  public  sector  was
negligible.
It follows  from  the  abo"e  discussion  that  a correct  calculation  of
the  government's  revenue  from  money  creation  requires  a careful  examination
of the  structure  of the  financial  system  and  of the  regulations  on reserve
requirements.
We now turn  to the  Argentine  case. On  June  1, 1977  a financial
reform  introduced  a fractional  reserve  banking  system  and  liberalized
interest  rates. The  central  bank  paid  interest  on the  required  reserves  on
time  deposits  to  compensate anrks  for  the  cost  of these  "immobilized'
funds. At the  same  time,  it  charged  conmercial  banks  interest  on the
fraction  of the  stock  of demand  deposits  (on  which  banks  did  not  pay
interest)  that  they  were  able  to lend. In other  words,  the  central  bank
taxed  away  the  seigniorage  levied  by commercial  banks  on  demand  deposits,
while  it  compensated  them  for  the  required  reserves  on time  deposits. 4
Given  that  the interest  rate  paid  and  charged  on reserves  was roughly
the  same,  the  inflation  tax  (in  steady  state)  was given  by
(8)  rtax  - f(cc  + rddd  + rtdt)  + i(l-rd)dd  - irtdt
4  This  system.of  taxes  and  subsidies  WV:b  recorded  through  the  Monetary
Regulation  Account  (MRA,  in  Spanish  Cuenta  de  Rebalacion  Monetaria).  Two  reasons
were  invoked  for  the  creation  of  the  MRA in  June,  1977:  (a)  Paying  interest  on
the legal reserves  required  for time deposits  was a mechanism  designed  to
eliminate  the distortionary  effect  of a high legal reserve requirement  on
interest  rates.  (b)  Taking  away  the  inflation  tax  on commercial  banks  demand
deposits  provided  an  instrument  to  avoid  an  'unfair'  advantage  of  the  latter  over
other  financial  institutions  (financieras  and  savings  and loans  associatiors),
that  were  not  allowed  to  accept  demand  deposits. For  a  complete  description  of
the  Monetary  Regulation  Account,  see  En&ayos  Economicos,  No  31,  September  1984.9
where  cc,  dd and  dt are  resrectively  currency,  demand  and  time  deposits  in
real  terms,  and  rd and  rt  are  the  reserve  requirements  on  demand  and  time
d&posits.
If  we assume  that  the  interest  rate  paid  on reserves  is  equal  to the
rate  of inflation,  we can  rewrite  (8)  as
(8') rtax  - w(cc  +  dd) .
Hi,  which  is  usually  defined  as the  sum  of currency  plus  demand  deposits,
thus  becomes  the  basis  for  the  inflation  tax (irtax).
This  set  up appears  to  be appropriate  in studying  the  inflation  tax
in  Argentina. A casual  look  at the  evidence  indicates  that  the  central
bank sets  the  interest  rate  on  bank  reserves  at roughly  the  same  levels  as
the  rate  of inflation. The  choice  of  Ml appears  to  be robust  to  the
various  institutional  changes  that  took  place  in  the  period  under  study5.
III.  Seigniorage  and  Inflation  Tax  in  Argentina
In the  previous  section  we established  that  Hi is  the  relevant
monetary  aggregate  to  measure  inflation  tax  and seigniorage.  In this
section  we will present  our  estimates  of these  variables  for  the  period
under  study  and  a brief  interpretation  of the  stylized  facts.
There  are  a number  of technical  difficulties  that  arise  when one
5  After  the  July  1982  financial  reform  the  legal  reserve  requirement
for  demand  deposits  was  usually  above  90Z.10
attempts  to obtain  accurate  measures  of inflation  tax  and  seigniorage.  An
important  part  of  the  problem  is  that  the  government  obtains  seigniorage
and  collects  the  inflation  tax  on a continuous  basis  while  our  estimates
are  based  on discrete  observations.  This  concern  can  be very  difficult  to
orercome  whan inflation  is  high (in  three  digit  levels). 6
In  this  paper  we adopted  a  methodology  to calculate  the  inflation  tax
and  seigniorage  that  satisfies  some  basic  consistency  criteria  and  yields
results  that  are  compatible  with the  existing  literature  and  the  empirical
evidence. In a discrete  time  version,  inflation  tax  and  seigniorage  (S)
are  given  by
(9)  S - (Mt  - Mlt_)/GDPt
(10)  ltax  - S - (Mlt/PtYt  - Mt-l/Pt-lYt)
where  GDPt  is the  nominal  gross  national  product,  Yt is  real  gross  domestic
product  in  period  t and  Pt is  the  price  level  at the  end  of  period  t.
These  definitions  ensures  that  S - itax  in  the  steady  state.
The  results  of our  calculations  of  monthly  seigniorage  and  of the
inflation  tax  using  equations  (9)  and (10)  from  1977  to 1987  are  presented
in figure  3.7  We also  included  the  corresponding  inflation  rates  to
illustrate  the  relationship  between  them.
6  For  an  excellent  discussion  of some  of  the  problems  see  Rodriguez  (1985)
and  Bressiani-Turroni  (1937),  Appendix  to  Chapter  3.  Some  of the  difficulties
in  measuring  seigniorage  are  also  addresaed  in  Cukierman  (1988).
7  A  5 period  moving  average  was calculated  for  seigniorage  to  compensate
for  seasonal  fluctuations  in the  variables.11
This figure  indicates  that  seigniorage  has  been  an important  source
of revenue  in  Argentina,  exceeding  3  percent  of GDP  for  most of the  period.
There  is also  a  marked  increase  in seigniorage  between  1982  and  1985,  which
was accompanied  by an increase  in the  rate  of inflation. Seigniorage  fell
from  mid-1985  on (after  the  Austral  plan)  and  basically  remained  at pre-
1982  levels.
Changes  in seigniorage  were  very  significant  in five  occasions.
There  were two  sharp  reductions  in seigniorage,  the  first,  at the  beginning
of 1981,  resulted  from  capital  outflows  in anticipation  of large
devaluations  (i.e.  the  end  of the  tablita  period);  the  second,  in  late
1984,  resulted  from  the  implementation  of tight  money. There  were also
three  large  increases  in seigniorage,  the  first,  in  the  second  half  of
1982,  was caused  by the  monetization  of  domestic  debt  under  Cavallo;  the
second,  in late  1983  and  early  1984  resulted  from  a large  increase  in  the
budget  deficit;  and  the  last,  in  mid-1985,  was driven  by a remonetization
during  the  early  stages  of the  Austral  plan.
Of special  interest  is the  acceleration  in inflation  that  started  in
1982  and  was brought  to  a halt  by the  Austral  plan in  mid-1985. This
acceleration  was taking  place  at a time  when seigniorage  was relatively
high (around  6  percent  of  GDP)  but  constant. One  plausible  interpretation
of this  episode,  consistent  with  our  discussion  in section  II.A,  is  that
the  amount  of seigniorage  was excessive  in the  sense  that  it  could  not  be
financed  by any  stable  rate  of inflation. Instead,  it  had to  be financed
in an  unstable  fashion  through  increasingly  higher  inflation  rates.
IV.  The  Demand  for  Money  and  the  Inflation  Tax  Laffer  Curve12
In this  section  we  will investigate  7rhether  seigniorage  levels  were
in  effect  excessive  in  Argentina  based  on an estimation  of the  demand  for
money. Using  Cagan's  demand  for  money  function  we will attempt  to
determine  the  value  of the  revenue  maximizing  rate  of inflation  and  the
corresponding  level  of seigniorage.
There  is  no agreement,  based  on the  existing  literature  on th.  demand
for  money  in  Argentina,  regarding  the  revenue  maximizing  rate  of inflation.
Fernandez  and  Mantel  (1985),  for  example,  estimated  that  this  rate  is in
the  20  percent  per  month  range,  Rodriguez  (1988)8  calculated  numbers  that
are  closer  to 30  percent  per  month,  while  Demaestri  and  Duefias  (1978)
suggested  that  the  rate  is  closer  to 7  percent.  Melnick  (1988)
incorporates  a ratchet  effect  in  the  demand  for  money  and  estimates  the
revenue  maximizing  rate  of inflation  at 22Z  when  inflation  exceeds  previous
levels  and  at 29Z  when it  does  not.
In this  vection  we will investigate  the  characteristics  of the  demand
for  money  in  Argentina  based  on  monthly  data  from  1979  to 1985. For
estimation  purposes  we will divide  the  sample  into  three  clearly
differentiated  periods. The  first  one,  from  January  1979  to  January  1981,
corresponds  to the  interval  in  which  the  government  preannounced  the  value
of the  exchange  rate (the  otablita'  period). The  authorities  started  the
preannouncement  of the  exchange  rate  on  December  20,  1978  and  the  regime
continued  in  place  until  February  1981,  when  a 10  percent  unscheduled
devaluation  was effected. During  this  time  there  were  no controls  on
8  in Bruno  et al,  Inflation  and  Stabilization 13
capital  flows  and  hence  the  quantity  of  money  was  endogenously  determined.
Interest  rates  (which  represent  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money)  were
essentially  determined  by arbitrage  conditions  and  closely  followed  the
international  interest  rate  plus  the  expected  rate  of  depreciation  of the
exchange  rate (see  Blejer  1982).
There  was  a second  transitional  period,  from  February  1981  until  June
1982,  characterized  by continuous  changes  in the  structure  of the  financial
markets  and  a lack  of a rule  for  the  exchange  rate. There  were  two  maxi-
devaluations  in 1981 (30  percent  deval-±ation  in  April,  followed  by  another
of the  same  size  in  June)  and  a dual  exchange  market  was adopted  from  June
to  December. The  financial  markets  were also  disturbed  by the  war in the
South  Atlantic,  a period  during  which  financial  and  foreign  exchange
markets  were tightly  regulated.
The  third  period,  from  July  1982  till  March  1985,  is the  pre-Austral
plan  period. During  that  time  interest  rates  were  regulated  and  there  were
restricti^.s  on  capital  flows.  ',.e  central  bank  pegged  the  interest  rate
on deposits,  although  interest  rates  were  periodically  adjusted  according
to  changes  in the  rate  of inflation.  Throughout  the  period  there  was  a
pegged  official  exchange  rate  and  a parallel  unofficial  rate.
There  was an important  difference  in the  adjustment  of the  money
market  after  June  1982. Prior  to that  time,  agents  could  alter  their  stock
of  money  balances  to the  desired  levels  by selling  to or  buying  from  the
central  bank  foreign  exchange. The  introduction  of capital  controls  in
June  altered  the  adjustmenL  mechanism  and  gave  more control  over  the  money
supply  to the  central  bank.  It  is important  for  the  reader  to  keep  this
difference  in  mind  when looking  at the  econometric  results  for  the  two14
periods  that  we estimate.
The  estimation  of the  demand  for  money  vill only  be done  for  the
first  and  third  periods. We decided  to drop  the  period  between  February
1981  and  June  1982  due  to  the  small  number  of observations  that  we had,  and
to  the  biases  introduced  by the  frequent  changes  in  regimes  that  took  place
during  this  short  interval. In  addition,  based  on simple  econometric
tests 9, we found  that  it  was  not  appropriate  to include  this  transition  in
either  the  Tablita  or the  pre-Austral  periods.
The  money  demand  function  we estimate  is the  one  employed  by Cagan
(1956)  in  his  classic  study  of the  European  hyperinflation.
(11) mtd  _ aO  + a1 xt+l  +  pt
where  mt  - ln  Mltd _  ln  Pt
xt+l  - opportunity  cost  of  holding  money  in  period  t+l.
The  ai's  are  parameters  representing  a  constant  and  the  semi-
elasticity  of the  demand  for  money,  pt is  the  error  term.
I) The  "tablitaZ  period:  January  1979-January  1981
The financial  regime  prevailing  during  the  'Tablital  period  offered
important  advantages  from  an  estimation  point  of  view.  The  nominal
interest  rate,  the  independent  variable  in  the  regression,  can  be taken  as
exogenously  determined  through  the  exchange  rate  rule  and  the  interest  rate
parity  condition. Whereas  money  supply,  the  dependent  variable, was
9  Chow  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no structural  bias  in  the  money
demand  function's  parameters  when  we extend  the 'tablita 3 period  to June  1982.
If we  assume instantaneous  market clearing  in the money market the null
hypothesis  of  no change  in  the  parameters  is  rejected  when  we extend  the  sample
period  only  until  march  1981.1S
endogenously  determined.  These  represent  an ideal  set  of conditions  for
estimating  the  money  demand  function.
In  our  model  we assume  that  domestic  nominal  interest  rates  were
determined  by arbitrage  corditions.  In  other  words,  the  following  equation
is  assumed  to  hold  continuously;
(12)  it  - i  *t + (ete+ 1 - et)  +  ut
where
it  - O  day  domestic  deposit  interest  rate  (Z  per  month).
L  *t  - international  interest  rates.
ete+l  - expectation  of the (log)  exchange  rate  for  t+l.
et  - (log)  exchange  rate  at  the  end  of period  t
Ut  - deviations  from  interest  rate  parity  resulting  from  risk
premium  and  other  sources.
Two  alternatives  were  considered  regarding  the  interest  rates  and
money  market  shocks. If the  shock  to interest  rates,  ut,  is  uncorrelated
with the  money  market  shock,  /t,  we can substitute  (12)  into (11)  and
estimate  this  equation  using  OLS.  If,  on the  other  hand,  ut is  correlated
with  pt, we have to  use  two  stage  least  squares  in  order  to obtain  unbiased
and  consistent  estimators  of the  parameters.  We estimated  equation'  (11)
under  both  assumptions,  and  we used  current  and  past  values  of the  rate  of
devaluation  (a  policy  variable)  and  the  prime  rate  at a  New  York  money
center  bank  as instruments  for  the  TSLS  estimation.
We also  make two  alternative  assumptions  about  the  adjustment
mechanism  in the  money  market. We consider  a  model  in  which  there  is  a lag
in the  adjustment  in the  money  market  (as  in  Chow (1966),  Goldfeld  (1973),16
and  Khan  and  Knight  (1984)  among  others),  and  a second  model  where  we
assume  that  the  money  market  continuously  clears.
For  the  partial  adjustment  model  we estimated:
(13) mt - raO  +  Tal it + (1-T)  mt_l  + t  P/t
where  T  - speed  of adjustment  of the  money  market.
For  the  market  clearing  model (mt  - mtd, for  all  t)  we estimated:
(14) mt - ao + a, it  +  pt
The  results  from  estimating  (13)  and (14)  for  the 'tablital  period
are  presented  in table  110  11,  The  Durbin-Watson  statistic  is reported  for
the  market  clearing  model  and  Durbin's  (1970)  h-statistic  is  reported  for
the  partial  adjustment  model. We observe  that  the  assumptions  regarding
the :orrelation  if  interest  rates  and  money  market  disturbances  as  well  as
the  speed  of adjustment  of the  money  market  do  not  significantly  affect  the
estimated  values  of the  money  demand's  structural  parameters.  However,  the
10  Two methods were employed to correct the model for seasonal
correlation  in the residuals.  The first  one  was to assume  a seasonal  12th
order  moving  average  process.  The  second  one  was  to  introduce  a  seasonal  dummy
fcr  the  aO that  is  equal  to 1  every  December  and  zero  otherwise.  We did  not  use
a seasonal  auto-regressive  representation  for  the  pt's or a full  fledged  X-ll
methcd  due  to the  small  number  of observations  (25).
11  The  data  employed,  all  from  DATAPIEL,  are  the  end  of  period  interest
rates  on 30 day  deposits  in Buenos  Aires (measured  in  percent  per  month), the
end of period  real  stock  of money is the  ratio  of the  end  of period  stock  of
nominal  Ml to the  end  of  period  consumer  price  index  (1974-100). End  of period
prices  were  taken  to be  the  mean  of the  monthly  average  price  (CPI)  in  t  and  in
t+l  - i.e.  Pt - .5(AvPt  +  AvPt+ 1).17
speed  of adjustment  of the  money  market  is  not robust  to  the  choice  of the
seasonal  correction  model  or to  the  assumption  o; the  stochastic  contents
of interest  rates.
In the  inflation  tax  literature,  the  revenue  from  inflation  is
maximized  at the  point  where  the  demand  for  money  is  unit  elastic  with
respect  to the  rate  of inflation.  Equations  (13)  and (14)  were estimated
using  the  interest  rate  as  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money. We found
that  the  demand  for  money  was unit  elastic  at interest  rates  that  ranged
from  a low  estimate  of 17.2Z  (0-3.27)  per  month  in  the  seasonal  moving
average  partial  adjustment  model  with instrumental  variables,  to  a high
estimate  of 22.22  (o-3.61)  in the  instrumental  variables  market  clearing
model  with a dummy  variable  for  December. The  corresponding  revenue
maximizing  rate  of inflation  can  be calculated  simply  by subtracting  the
real  interest  rate  from  these  numbers.
2)  The *pre-Austral'  period:  July 1982  - March  1985
There  were significant  changes  in the  money  supply  process  and in  the
determination  of interest  rates  between  the  third  period  (July  1982  to
March  1985)  and  the  time  of the "Tablita'.  The  imposition  of restrictions
on capital  flows  limited  the  degree  of "endogeneity'  in the  money  supply.
It became  more  difficult  for  the  private  sector  to  adjust  real  money
balances  through  changes  in  the  money  supply. Consequently,  prices  played
a  more important  role  in the  adjusting  mechanism  of the  money  market  during
this  period. In addition,  interest  rates  on deposits,  which  were freely
determined  during  the 'Tablital,  were fixed  by the  central  bank  which
determined  the  regulated  interest  rate.
The  introduction  of  controls  on interest  rates  complicates  the  choice18
regarding  the  appropriate  variable  to  measure  the  opportunity  cost  of
holding  money  during  this  period. After  a  careful  examination  of the
possible  alternatives  we chose  the  regulated  interest  rate,  the  actual  rate
of inflation,  and  an indicator  of inflationary  expectations.  The  latter
was generated  by regressing  the  actual  rate  of inflation  on its  own  lags
and  on current  and  lagged  regulat;ud  rates. 12
We first  performed  tests  to determine  whether  the  variables  were
integrated.  We rejected  the  hypothesis  that  the  logarithm  of the  real
stock  and  the  three  opportunity  costs  of holding  money  being  considered  are
not co-integrated  variables  as defined  by Engle  and  Granger  (1987)13.
Cagan's  equation  then  becomes  the  co-integrating  regression  and  it can  be
estimated  by ordinary  least  squares  (OLS). 14
We reproduce,  for  convenience,  Engle  and  Granger's  (1987)  definition
of co-integration.
Definition:  The  vector  y'  - (mt,xt+l)  is said  to be co-
integrated  of order  d, b, denoted  (mt,xt+l)  -
CI(d,b),  if (i%  {mt}  and (xt+l}  are  integrated  of
12 We decided  against  the  use  of the  interest  rate  on commercial  paper
because it was a  rate available  only to large corporations.  We also
considered  the  expected  rate of depreciation  of the  black  market  exchange
rate.  However,  we found  that  this  rate  was  very difficult  to forecast.  We
could  not reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  it is  a constant  plus  white  noise
with a 97.5X  significance  level  and  we found  that  it  was uncorrelated  with
other  suitable  variableei
13  Melnick (1988)  also finds co-integration  in his study of the
Argentine  demand  for  money.
14  Identification  results from the  fact that, given  the  bi-
dimensionality  of our system,  there  is a unique  linear  combination  of {mt)
and {x t+l}  that is stationary  and from  assuming  that the  money  market  is
stable.  Consistency  is an asymptotic  property of the  least squares
estimators  of co-integrating  vectors.19
order  d, I(d);  and (ii)  there  exists  a  non-zero
vector  a'  so  that  z - a'y  - I(d-b);  b>O.  The  vector
a  is  called  the  co-integrating  vector.
Since  our  co-integrated  system  consists  of only  two  variables  the  co-
integrating  vector  is  unique. There  is  only  one  equilibrium  relationship
between  mt and  xt.l  that  is statiLnary.  This  result  of co-integration
theory  is  useful  for  identification  purposes. All linear  combinations  of
mt and  xt+l,  except  the  one  defined  by the  co-integrating  vector  a,  will  be
non-stationary  and  have infinite  variances.
Assume  that  the  demand  for  money  is
(15) mtd - aO +  a, xt+l
and  let  the  money  market  equilibrium  errors  be given  by
(16) zt - m  - aO - al  xt+l
if the  differences  between  the  quantity  of  money  demanded  and  the
observed  one  have a  tendency  to  be corrected  (i.e.  they  are  stationary  with
a zero  mean)  the  money  market  is stable,  and  then  we know that  leait
squares  will estimate  the  parameters  of Cagan's  equation  (the  elements  of
the  co-integrating  vector). Other  linear  relations  between  the  (log)  stock
of  money  and  its  opportunity  costs  will  not  yield  stationary  errors.
The  estimators  of the  money  demand  function  parameters  will be
subject  to  two  sources  of  bias.  First,  there  is  a simultaneity  bias  that20
arises  whenever  the  current  price  level  enters  into  Xt+l11 5 A  second
source  of bias  is due  to  an errors  in  variables  problem 16 since  during  the
'pre-Austral*  period  there  war  no market  measure  of the  expected  cost  of
holding  Ml,  x.+.1  In spite  of these  small  sample  biases  (of  order  O(T- 1))
the  least  square  estimators  of the  money  demand  function  will be consistent
because  the  regressors  have  a  higher  order  of integration  than  the  error
term (Phillips  and  Durlauf,  1986,  Stock  1987,  1988).
There  are  two  steps  in  testing  for  co-integration.  We first  have to
test  whether  the  two  autoregressive  representations  of the  time series
processes  (mt),  {rt)  and  'rt)  have  a unit  root. If the  first  condition  is
satisfied  we then  need to test  the  residuals  of the  co-integrating
regression  for  non-stationarity.  If the  null  hypothesis  of  non-
stationarity  is  rejected  we find  co-integration.  We employ  Dickey-Fuller
(DF)  and  Phillips-Perron  (PP) 17 tests  to determine  if the  system  has  unit
roots.  (The  formulas  of the  PP statistics  and  critical  values  can  be found
in the  appendi).
We use the  equations  (17.a)  to (17.c)  to test  the  first  condition  for
co-integration.  Our  objective  is to select  one  of the  three  models  to
represent  the  time  series  behavior  of  yt.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  of  a
15  Sargent  and  Wallace  (1973).
16  This source  of bias can be eliminated  by estimating  the reverse
regression  (of xt+l on mt) and assuming  that the measurement  errors are
uncorrelated  with  mt.
17  Phillips-Perron  propose a set of tests on unit roots that are
transformations  of those proposed by Dickey-Fuller  (1979,1981).  The PP
statistics  converge  in  distribution  to  the  DF  ones  under  mild  conditions  on  the
innovation  sequences  (ut)  in (15),  which allow  for finite  ARMA processes  and
heteroskedasticity.21
unit  root,  equation  (17.a)  representf  a random  walk,  (17.b)  is  a  random
walk  with drift,  while (17.c)  corresponds  to a case  that  exhibits
deterministic  non-stationarityl 8.
(17.a) Yt  - a  Yt-l  +  ut
(17.b)  Yt  P  + Q  Yt-l  *  u*t
(17.c) yt - p  +  S(t-T/2)  + a  Yt  l  +  Ut
The selection  criteria  based  on the  PP tests  are  the  following.  We
start  using  model (17.c)  and  we use  the  statistic  Z(t 3) to test  the  null
(B-O,Pm/5,Ql)  and  the  statistics  Z(a)  and  Z(tV)  to test  the  unit  root
hypothesis. If  we do  not reject  the  null  hypothesis  of a random  walk  with
drift,  represented  by  model (17.b),  we proceed  with Z(02)  to test  the  null
of a driftless random  walk  (p.B=O,A=l).  If we do not reject the driftless
case  based  on the statistics  obtained  from  (17.c)  we t:hen  use  equation
(17.b)  to calculate  the  statistics  Z(01),  Z(a*)  and  Z(.2Q*)  which  can  then
be used  to  perform  additional  more  powerful  tests. 19 The  regressiors
(17.a)-(17.b)  are reported  in table  II.A  and  the  Phillips-Perron  tests  in
18  The reader  should  keep in mind that these tests  have low power
against  the alternative  hypothesis  that the variables  are trend stationary
instead  of difference  stationary  (De Jong and  Whiteman (1989).  The latter
hypothesis  has the  appeal  of allowing  for  the  possibility  of stabilization
plans.
19  It is important  to start  with model (17.c)  because  if the  series
(yt) is stationary  around  a linear  trend  it can be shown  that T(4*-1)  and
Z(t  a*)  converge  in  probability  to  zero.22
the  Table  11.3.
In  the  tests  for  inflation  we cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that
inflation  is  a random  walk  with drift.  We first  observe  in  the  Phillips-
Perron  set  of tests  that  0(*3)  does  not  reject  the  hypothesis  HO:
(Bqamp,#a-l)  at a 102  significance  level. The  statistics  Z(a),  Z(ta)  do
not  reject  the  hypothesis  of a  unit  root  (a-1)  either.  We then  use  the
statistic  Z(02)  and  we reject  the  null  Hot (C-p-0,  a-1)  at  a 52 or 12
significance  level  depending  on the  residuals  we use for  estimating  the
nuisance  parameters  o and  au 2 . We therefore  conclude  that  model (17.b)
is the  more  appropriate  and  {1t) follow.  a random  walk  with drift 21.
The  tests  for  the  time  series  properties  of the  log  of the  real  money
stock  (mt)  also  do  not reject  the  hypothesis  of an I(1)  process.  In  model,
(17.c)  the statistics  Z(03),  Z(a)  and  Z(tq)  do not  reject  their  respective
null  hypothesis  at a 102  significance  level.  Z(02)  rejects  the  null
(/mBm0,6ml)  at a 5  significance  level. Again  we accept  the  hypothesis  of
a random  walk  with drift 22.
The tests  for  the  regulated  deposit  interest  rate  also  select  the
random  walk  with drift.  None  of the  statistics  based  on  model (17.c),
20  The  PP  tests  involve  the  estimation  of  two  nuisance  parameters,  through
the statistics  S2u, S2Tl;which  are sensitive  to the  estimators  we use for  the
ut's.  Both,  the  residuals  of  model  (15.a)  and  the  first  differences  (yt  - ytt
1) can  be used for estimating  them under  the  null of a driftless  random  walk
(p1-B0,  al).  S2
1 yields  a consistent  estimator  of a  when 1 grows  at the
controlled  rate  T-17, which  in  our  case  is  33-113-3.2.
21  DF ard  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  tests  using  up to four
lagged  differences  do not reject  the  unit root  hypothesis  in  model (15.b)  for
the  rate  of inflation.
22  DF tests  in  which  the  errors  are  corrected  for  seasonality  fail  to
reject  the  unit  root  hypothesis  in "odel  (15.b).23
Z(4 3), Z(U)  and  Z(ti),  rejects  its  respective  null  hypotlhesis. Z(0 2)
rejects  the  driftless  random  walk at  a 10t  significance  level 23.
DF tests  on the  second  differences  of (rt),  {rt  and  (mt)  reject  the
unit root  hypothesis  at a 12 significance  level,  thus  suggesting  that  the
first  differences  are  stationary.
The second  step  in  testing  for  co-integration  is  to test  whether  the
residuals  of the  forward  (of  mt on  xt+l)  and  of the  reverse  (of  xtl  on  mt)
co-integrating  regressions  are  non-stationary.  We estimated  the  co-
integrated  regressions  using  regulated  deposit  interest  rates,  the  actual
inflation  and  a linear  projection  of  the  rate  of inflation  as proxies  for
xt+l  mIn  all  the four  possible  co-integrating  regressions  based  on the  rate
of inflation,  the  ADF(1)  test  rejected  the  unit  root  at a 12 significance
level.  For  the  regression  with  the  regulated  interest  rate  the  ADF(l)  test
rejected  the  null  at a 52 significance  level. So  we can  finally  conclude
that  the  log  of the  real  stock  of  money  and  the  expected  cost  of holding
money  are  co-integrated,  (mt,xt+l)  - CI(l,l).
The  structural  parameters  of the  money  demand  function  are  estimated
by the  co-integrating  regression.  As mentioned  before  they  are  subject  to
two  sources  of small  sample  biases  that  arise  because  of a simultaneity
problem  and  because  of errors  in  variables. This  last  source  of  bias
disappears  in  the  reverse  regression 24. The  revenue  maximizing  rate  of
23 DF and  ADF  tests  fail  to reject  the  unit  root  hypothesis  for  regulated
interest  rates  in  model (15.b).
24  The errors  in  variables  problem  biases  the  estimator  of a, towards
zero.  If  x£t+1 - xt+l  + 6t+l  then
mt - a 0 + a l(xt+l  + 6t+l) + (z  t - a 1 6t+l)24
inflation  estimated  from  the  reverse  regression  is 19.4Z  (5-2.02)  when  we
use  the  regulated  deposit  interest  rate  as a proxy  for  the  cost  of  holding
money,  17.99Z  (r-3.68)  when  we use  the  actual  inflation  and  18.47Z  (5-2.91)
when  we use the  linear  projections  of inflation 25. The  error  in  variables
bias  may  explain  the  difference  between  our  estimate  of the  revenue
maximizing  rate  of inflation  and  the  one  obtained  by  R. Fernandez  and  C.
Rodriguez 26, since  their  estimate  of 30.5Z  is  similar  to those  we obtain  in
the  forward  regressions. The  errors  in  variables  bias  may  explain  why the
estimates  of the  parameters  of the  forward  regressions  are  more sensitive
to  the  choice  of the  proxy  for  the  opportunity  cost  holding  money  than  the
estimates  derived  from  the  reverse  regression.  Melnick  (1988)  estimates  the
elasticity  of a rise  of inflation  above  the  previous  highest  level  to  be
one  when the inflation  rate  is 22Z  per  month.
The similarity  between  these  estimates  and  those  obtained  for  the
*tablital  regime  is striking. This  is surprising  in  view  of the
significant  changes  in the  institutional  setting  in  the  two  periods. Under
the "tablita"  regime  domestic  interest  rates  were  market  determined  and
there  was international  capital  mobility,  and  during  the *pre-austral*
regime  interest  rates  were set  by the  central  bank,  yielding  negative  real
where  we see  that  -al6  t+l  is  positively  correlated  with  x*t+l.  In  the  reverse
regression  this  bias  disappears  because  6t+l  is  assumed  to  be  independent  of  mt.
25  These  statistics  are  not  normally  distributed,  their  distributions
are skewed  and have a small sample  bias that lowers  the estimated  revenue
maximizing  rate  of inflation.
26  See  comments  by  C.  Rodriguez  in  M.  Bruno  et.  al.  Inflation  Stabilization.25
returns,  and  there  was  no capital  mobility 27.
V. Implications  and  Final  Reflections
The  analysis  of the  previous  sections  shows  that  inflation  in
Argentina  had  an important  role  generating  public  sector  revenues. The
rate  of inflation,  however.  has  exceeded  our  estimated  revenue  maximizing
rate  in  many  occasions  during  the  pre-Austral  period. This  in itself
presents  a number  of  puzzles. Did  the  authorities  tolerate  rates  of
inflation  that  are  inefficient  from  a public  finance  perspective?  Did
these  apparently  excessive  rates  of inflation  perform  a fiscal  role?
The  results  of section  IV imply  that  at the  revenue  maximizing  rate
of inflation  the  government  can  obtain  seigniorage  of  about '.5  percent  of
GDP  in steady  state. This  is true  for  the 'tablital  and  the  pre-Austral
periods. The  actual  relationship  between  inflation  and  the  inflation  tax
between  June  1978  and  April  1985  is  presented  in figure  4  by the  small
squares. It can  be seen  there  that  there  is  a  clear,  positive  relation
between  inflation  and  the  inflation  tax  for  rates  of inflation  below  18
percent. In this  respect  the  results  are  consistent  with our  analysis  in
section  IV.  The  interpretation  of the  events  is  more  difficult  for  rates
of inflation  near  and  above  20  percent. There  is a cluster  of observations
in  the  20  percent  range,  with the  inflation  tax  ranging  from  7  to 10
percent  of  5DP.  For rates  of inflation  in excess  of 20  percent  the
27  If  we extend  the  sample  period  to  July  1982  - Hay  1988  the  reverse
regression  of  money  on inflation  still  estimates  the  revenue  maximizing  rate  of
inflation  at 21.84  (a-1.84)  percent  per  month.26
relationship  is  even  less  clear. Increases  in  the  rate  of inflation  are
not successful  in securing  more inflation  tax  revenues  once  inflation
exceeds  that  level.
The  overall  evidence  is  consistent  with the  results  of our
estimation.  The  solid  line  in figure  4  corresponds  to the  fitted  relation
between  inflation  and  the  inflation  tax  using  the  estimates  of the  demand
for  money  from  the "tablital  period. Steady  state  seigniorage  is  maximized
at around  7.5  percent  of GDP  when inflation  is  21.1  percent  per  month. The
diagram  suggest  that  the  maximizing  revenue  could  be close  to 8.5  percent
of  GDP.  a level  that  is still  within  the  margin  of error  of our
regressions. 28 The  evidence  also  indicates  that  in those  instances  in
which  this  level  was exceeded  inflation  displayed  a tendency  to  accelerate.
The  revenue  from  inflation  seems  to fall  unambiguously  once  inflation
exceeds  22  percent.
An important  finding  of our  study  is  that  the  inflation  tax  has
remained  close  to,  and  even  exceeded  the  maximum  sustainable  levels  during
most  of the  first  half  of the  eighties. Indeed,  this  appears  to  have  been
the  single  most important  source  of revenue  to the  government  during  this
period. This  implies  that  any  serious  stabilization  effort  should  find  an
alternative  source  of revenue  to replace  the  inflation  tax.
28  Fernandez  and  Mantel  (1988)  estimates  indicate  that  the  government
can  get  up to  8.5  percent  of  GDP from  the  inflation  tax.27
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TABLE  I: Tablita  Reuime  (January  1979  - January  1981)
(1)  Partial  Adjustment  Model:  mt - (1-7)  mt_l  +  7  a0 + r  a 1 i  t +  /t
(2)  Market  clearing  Models  mt  i  a  0°+  a1 it + Pt
MODEL (1)  MODEL  (2)
SMA(12) SMA(12)  Dec  SMA(12)  SMA(12) Dec
A(C1)
TSLS  TSLS  TSLS  TSLS
(1-7)  0.28  0.21  0.39
(2.22)  (1.51)  (4.23)
ra 0 -2.316  -2.521  -1.991
(-5.55) (-5.59)  (-6.60)
ral -0.039  -0.048  -0.030
(-4.06) (-4.34)  (-4.12.)
ao  -3.21  -3.1E  -3.26  -3.24  -3.20  -3.27
(-47.11) (-45.35) (-55.7)  (-60.7)  (-49.2)  (-71.8)
a1 -. 054  -. 06  -. 049  -.049  -. 056  -. 046
(-4.65)  (-5.06) (-5.17)  (-4.41)  (-5.11) (-6.0)
Q412)  8.9  4.2  9.25  8.5
F  21.3  18.3  49.7  26.0  15.5  28.8
R2 .75  .72  .88  0.70  0.58  0.80
h or  DV  1.06  .20  .40  1.69  1.69  1.95
E(l/al)  19.4  17.2  21.1  21.1  18.4  22.2
0(1lal)  (3.98)  (3.27)  (4.08)  (3.78) (3.48) (3.61)
Notes:  i.  Number  of observations:  25
ii.  t-statistics  are in  parenthesis  except  for  E(l/a 1),
where  the  standard  deviation  is  reported.
iii.  t-statistics  for  structural  parameters  of the  partial
adjustment  model  are  based  on the  variance  of the
asymptotic  distribution.
iv.  SMA(12):  Seasonal  moving  average
Dec (Dummy)  - 1 in  December,  0 otherwise.
v.  The  first  column  in  each  model  reports  the  estimation  with
no instruments.
vi.  TSLS  estimates  ;l)  and (2)  with instrumental  variables
using  lagged  interest  rate3  and  current  and lagged  rates
of  devaluation  as instruments  for  it.
vii.  TSLS  in  model (2),  Dec,  is  corrected  for  an  MA(i)  error
process.32
ThJLE  II.A:  Phillips-Perron  Rgressions
I.  MONEY  a  R2  DW
(17.a)  1.0057  .73  1.94
(259)
(17.b)  .343  .919  .74  1.82
(-.89)  (9.3)
(17.c)  -1.21  -. 478  .698  .77  1.66
(-2.05)  (-1.90)  (4,65)
II.  INFLATION
(17.a)  1.018  .67  1.62
(39)
(17.b)  1.76  .919  .67  1.52
(.89)  (8.02)
(17.c)  7.84  .204  .553  .74  1.46
(2.88)  (2.94)  (3.43)
III.  REGULATED  INTEREST  RATES
(17.a)  1.031  .88  1.94
(56)
(17.b)  1.07  .950  .88  1.90
1.--35)  (15.1)
(17.c)  4.46  .124  .662  .90  1.69
(2.62)  (2.22)  (4.64)33
TABLE  II.B:  Phillips-Perron  Tests
Model
(17.c) 1 Z(t 3)  Z(a)  Z(ta)  Z(0 2)
Money  1.38  -6.46  -1.70  10.70***  2
Inflation  5.19  -5.46  -2.16  5.44*3
Int.  Rate  2.93  -8.88  -2.29  4.91*
Model
(17.b)  Z(Z1)  Z(a)  Z(ta)
Money  12.08***  4  .08  .06
Inflation  4.73*5  .66  .30
Int.  Rate  4.44*  -. 99  -. 61
*  The  Null  hypothesis  is rejected  at a 10?  significance  level.
**  The  Null  hypothesis  is rejected  at a 5  significance  level.
***  The  Null  hypothesis  is  rejected  at a 1? significance  level.
1  The  truncation  lag  used  to  compute  S2T1  was 1  - 3.
2  When the  truncation  parameter,  1,  is 6  or 12 Z(# 2) becomes  2.41
and  2.39,  implying  that  we should  accept  the  driftless  case.
3  When the  residuals  of regression  (17.a)  are  used  under  the  null
of  a random  walk,  Z(0 2) - 10.28,  rejecting  the  null at  a 102 significance
level.
4  If  we allow  the  truncation  parameter  1  to  be 6  or 12 Z(9i)
becomes  1.56  and  1.59,  and  we should  accept  the  random  walk  hypothesis.
5  If  we use  the  first  differences  of the  inflation  rate  under  the
null  of the  random  walk this  statistic  becomes  1.3634
TABLE  III
Co-Integrating  Regressions:  July  1982-March  1985
(1)  mt "  a 0 +  a1 x t+1 +  w t ;  wt m Zt - a  6  t+  ;
6  t+1 ' xt+l - Z*t+1
xt+1  ao  a1 R2 DW  DF  ADF(I)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)
't+i  -3.52  -. 024  .43  .79  -. 46  -. 62  -. 60  -.36
(-39.17) (4.88)  (-3.03)  (-3.83)  (-2.7)  (-1.47)
,et+, -3.41  -.031  .40  .91  -. 50  -. 72  -. 72  -. 51
(-33.4)  (-5.4)  (-3.33)  (-4.49)  (-3.2)  (-1.92)
rt  -3.47 -.038  .75  .95  -. 43  -. 64  -.66  -. 64
(-67.3)  (-9.6)  (-2.89)  (-3.3) (-2.8)  (-2.26)
(2)  xt+l - -aO /a 1 +  1/a1 m t + W't  w't  - (-1/al zt  +  t+l )
1t+l  a0/a 1  1/a 1 R2  DW  DF  ADF(1) ADF(2)  ADF(3)
't.+j  -53.42  -17.99  .43  .82  -. 43  -. 63  -. 50  -. 41
(-3.67)  (-4.88)  (-2.92)  (-4.11)  (-2.56)  (-1.82)
,et+,  -55.33  -18.47  .57  1.13  -. 57  -. 76  -.57  -. 52
(-4.82) (-6.35)  (-3.40)  (-3.9)  (-2.34) (-1.88)
rt  -64.31  -19.40  .75  .81  -. 42  -. 53  -.55  -. 64
(-8.04) (-9.59)  (-2.84)  (-3.3)  (-2.87)  (-2.90)
A  ~  ~  AA  A  A
t+l  m bo  +  b, ff  t + b2  v  t-  _  3rt2  + b  4 rt  + b  5  _
Notes:i.  t-statistics  are  between  brackets
ii.  The forward  regression  is estimated  with  TSLS.
iii.  The  estimators  of the  co-integrating  regression  are  not  normally
distributed.
iv.  x*t+i  is the  true  expected  opportunity  cost  of  holding  money.35
APPENDIX
Statistics  on  model  17.c
ZOP  - (S2U/S 2Tl)t3  - (S 2Tl-S 2u)/2S 2Tl[T(a-1)-(T6148Dz)(S 2Tl-S 2U)1
Z(a )  - T(a-1) - (T 6/24Dz)(S 2Tl-S 2u)
Z(t&  )  - (S  USTl)ta  - (T 314  (3Dx)STl)(S 2Tl-s 2u)
Z(#2)  - (S 2 u'S 2 TlP#2  - (S 2 Tl-S 2u)/3S 2 T1[T(a-l)-(T6/48D.)(S
2 Tl-SZu)]
Statistics  on  model  17.b
Z(a*)  - T(a*-1)  - 1/2(S 2Tl-S 2u)[T-2E(yt_l-y_.l)2]l
ZCt6 *)  - (S2u/S2Tl)ta*  - (112S 2T1) (S2Tl-  S2u)[T-2E(yt_._y_1) 2 ]-(1/2)
Z(#i)  _  S-  S Tl#  SuTa*l14S2  2.(T  _(~:- 1)2I-'
- (l/2SZ2Tl)(S  Tl-SU){T(-l)-l 4(STl-SU)  1
t
where  S2u  - T-1  E  u2t  ,  u2t - residuals  from  appropriate  model.
t-1  T
* consistent  estimator  of  ou - lim  T-1  EE(ut 2)
T44  t-1
under  the  corresponding  null  hypothesis.
T  1  T
S2 T,  T-1  E u 2 t  + 2T-I  E  E  utut_j
t-l  J-i  t-j+l
T
- consistent  estimator  of  a - T-'E(S 2T) ,  s 2T-E  ut
t-1
under  the  corresponding  null  hypothesis.
DX - det(X'X)
l  - [TE(yt-yt_1) 2 _  TEu*2 ]/(2Eu*2)
t2  [TT(yt-yt_.) 2 - TEu- 2]/3Eu  2
3 -TE(yt-yt_1) 2 - (y-y_ 1)21/2Eu- 2
a* t*,Q.tQ are  the  standard  OLS statistics.36
CRITICAL  VALUES  OF THE  STATISTICS
Statistic Null  Hypothesis  T  P[Xgx]  - .10  .90  .95  .99
03  B - 0, a - ,I  I-p  25  1.33 5.91  7.24  10.61
in  model  17.c  50  1.37 5.61  6.73 9.31
t2  a  - p  - 0,  a  - 1  25  1.10 4.67  5.68 8.21
in  model  17.c  50  1.12 4.31  5.13  7.02
*l  p  - 0, a  - 1  25  0.65  4.12 5.18  7.88
in  model  17.b  50  0.66  3.94 4.86  7.06
P(Xgx]  - .10  .05  .01
ta  a  - 1 in  17.c  25  -3.24  -3.60  -4.38
50  -3.18  -3.50 -4.15
a  T(a-1)  - 0  in 17.c  25  -15.6  -17.9  -22.5
50  -16.8 -19.8  -25.7
ta*  a  - 1 in 17.b  25  -2.63 -3.00  -3.75
50  -2.60 -2.93  -3.58
a*  T(a-1)  - 0 in 1.b  25  -10.2 -12.5  -17.2
50  -10.7 -13.3  -18.9
Note:  The  Phillips-Perron  statistics  converge  in  distribution  to those  whose
critical  values  are  reported  above.
Source: Fuller  (1976),  Dickey-Fuller  (1981)37
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